The topic of rising income inequality does not only gain in relevance since the two prominent
Introduction
This study updates previous research by DIW Berlin on income inequality in Germany up to 2011 and includes analyses of individual income mobility over time. has been increasing for years in Germany, and as a result, the share of people with no or only low market incomes is also increasing. 5 Besides demographic effects, changes in wages and capital incomes also affect market incomes. Increases in negotiated wages were lower than the 1 See most recently: M. M. Grabka, J. Goebel, and J. Schupp. "Has Income Inequality Spiked in Germany?," DIW Economic Bulletin, No. 12 (2012) . 2 The SOEP is a representative, annually repeated panel survey of households which has been conducted in western Germany since 1984 and in eastern Germany as well since 1990; see G. G. Wagner, J. Goebel, P. Krause, R. Pischner, and I. Sieber, "Das Sozio-oekonomische Panel (SOEP): Multidisziplinäres Haushaltspanel und Kohortenstudie für Deutschland -Eine Einführung (für neue Datennutzer) mit einem Ausblick (für erfahrene Anwender)." AStA Wirtschafts-und Sozialstatistisches Archiv 2, No. 4, (2008): 301-328. 3 In accordance with the German Federal Government's Report on Poverty and Wealth (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2013: Life Situations in Germany) and the reports of the German Council of Economic Experts (most recently Annual Report 2012/2013: Stable Architecture for Europe -Need for Action in Germany), this report indicates the income year. The SOEP surveys annual incomes retrospectively for the previous calendar year, but weights them according to the population structure at the time of data collection. In other words, the data presented here for 2011 were collected in the survey wave 2012. 4 The median of the income distribution is the value that separates the richer half of the population from the poorer half. general inflation rate from 2006 to 2011. 6 The development is somewhat more positive when it comes to disposable household incomes (see Figure 2) . 7 Equivalized and inflation-adjusted net household incomes increased markedly in the second half of the 1990s and from 2008 to 2010. Although the data for 2011 do show a slight decline, it is within the confidence band and thus does not represent a statistically significant change. As measured by the arithmetic mean, households had higher real incomes at their disposal in 2011 than ten years previously. In terms of the median, however, no significant change can be determined over the course of this period.
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The discrepancy in the development of the arithmetic mean and the median suggest that disposable household incomes have developed differently in various parts of the income hierarchy. If the population is divided into deciles 9 and the mean income per decile is indexed to the year 2000, it is evident that the highest income earners (top decile) in particular achieved above-average increases in real income (see Figure 3) , which came to approximately 13 percent 2011. The eighth and ninth deciles also achieved slight increases in income of three to four percent. Incomes in the fifth to seventh deciles stagnated, while decreases in income of up to five percent, compared with the year 2000, were evident for the first through fourth deciles. The expansion of the low-wage labor market 10 and the weak development of retirement incomes, among other factors, appear to be relevant for income losses in the lowest income groups. Increases in the incomes of those in the highest decile, however, were caused by escalating incomes from capital investments and from self-employment. DIW Berlin, no. 45 (2011) . According to the official national accounts, however, effective gross incomes per employed person were 9.5 percent higher in 2011 than in 2006. In light of consumer price increases of 8.7 percent during the same period, this amounts to a marginal increase in real wages. It cannot be ruled out that the figures for wages will also be adjusted in the course of the major revision of the national accounts data due next year.
7
Disposable household incomes consist of market incomes, statutory pensions as well as state transfer payments such as child benefits, housing assistance, and unemployment benefits, minus direct taxes and social security contributions. To obtain deciles, the population is sorted according to level of income and then divided into ten groups of the same size. The lowest (highest) decile represents the income situation of the poorest (richest) ten percent of the population. It should be noted that individuals can change their income positions over time because of income mobility and should not be assigned to the same decile every time. 
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The slight increase in inequality of market incomes in 2011 can be ascribed to the inequality of capital incomes, which is increasing again, as well as to rising inequality in earned incomes. Even though the decline in income inequality was not very pronounced from 2006 onwards, entrepreneurial activity relative to the entire national income has become relatively more important. However, these types of income are concentrated mainly in the highest decile of income recipients. 12 For example, the working population increased by 2.6 million to 41.2 million from January 2005 to January 2012, Federal Statistical Office 2013: www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Indikatoren/Konjunkturindikatoren/Arbeitsmarkt/karb811.html. 13 For example, the value of the German share price index DAX was 3,666 points and more than doubled to 7,527 by May 2, 2011.
and slowed in 2011, it does seem remarkable compared with other countries: analyses by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reveal a trend of increasing inequality of disposable incomes-as measured by the Gini coefficient-for the majority of OECD member states (see Figure 7 ). The development is most striking in the Scandinavian countries and France.
Polarization and relative income poverty
The concept of income polarization was originally introduced to analyze the shrinking middle-income class (see Box 3). This concept allows us to determine whether the gap between different income classes has grown larger or smaller over time. Polarization increases in particular if the margins of the income distribution (the poor and the rich) grow larger while the middle section dominating the income distribution loses significance.
The concept of polarization is not always clearly differentiated from that of inequality in empirical studies. Classical indices of inequality measure the distance between incomes within a society. Polarization, in contrast, focuses not only on the distance between incomes, but also on possible groupings of these incomes along the income dimension, for example on the numbers of people with low or high incomes relative to those in the middle income segment.
In other words, when measuring income polarization, two dimensions must be differentiated as a matter of principle, namely homogeneity within the groups and heterogeneity between the groups. Since publication of the paper by Esteban and Ray in 1994,14 efforts have been made to combine the two dimensions of polarization in a single index. Fundamental to these indices is the reference system of identification and alienation.
The idea behind it is relatively simple: Polarization occurs when the different (income) groups become alienated from one another and at the same time, the people within one (income) group identify with it.
Polarization and growing inequality do not necessarily occur at the same time. It is even possible for inequality to decrease despite increasing polarization. For example, the differences within the groups at the margins of the distribution may decline while the income gap between the groups increases.
In the following, two alternative measures of polarization are used, one based on the work of 14 J.-M. Esteban and D. Ray, "On the measurement of polarization, " Economica, 62, no. 4 (1994) : 819-851.
show a progression similar to that of the indices for measuring the inequality of disposable household incomes. In the 1990s, income polarization stagnated, only to increase significantly from the turn of the millennium to 2005. Since then, both indices have remained high, even though polarization has recently been increasing again slightly.
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The concept of relative income poverty defines a person as at risk of poverty if he or she has less than 60 percent of the median of the total population's net household income available.
According to that, the at-risk-of-poverty threshold in 2011, based on the SOEP sample, was approximately 980 euros per month for a single-person household.
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In recent years, the poverty risk has largely developed in parallel to the progression of income inequality and income polarization (see Figure 9 ). Up until the mid-1990s, the poverty risk in
Germany was roughly 12 percent-with the rate higher overall in eastern Germany than in western Germany. In the years preceding the turn of the millennium, poverty risk declined slightly to 10.5 percent. Since then, it has risen-with minor fluctuations-to a peak of 15 percent in 2009. One of the causes is presumably short-time work, which was widespread during the economic crisis at that time. 18 In the last two years of the study (2010 and 2011), the at-risk-of-poverty rate in Germany initially declined slightly, but has remained at a constantly high level since then-and is lower than the European Union average.
19

Income Mobility Since Reunification
It is not only the development of the at-risk-of-poverty rate which is relevant from a social- Overall, the probability of belonging to the same income group at the end of a four-year period as at the beginning remained virtually constant for individuals at risk of poverty in the 1990s (see Figure 10 ). At the turn of the millennium, however, it rose sharply and has been at roughly 55 to 60 percent since then. In the case of people in the highest income group, development has been steadier, with the rate of people remaining in their group increasing most recently to 65 percent.
Mobility between the middle-income groups is considerably more pronounced overall, as movements are possible in both directions. The Shorrocks-Prais 24 index and the Hart index 25 were used to summarize the income mobility of all groups. Both indices point to a significant decrease in income mobility in the 1990s since German reunification (see Figure 11 ). Since 20 Using a window of four survey waves corresponds to the procedure for determining the fourth Laeken indicator (persistent at-risk-of-poverty rate DIW Berlin, no. 4 (2013) . 22 The first group represents people with relative income poverty (less than 60 percent of median income). The second and third groups comprise people below the median income (60 to less than 80 percent and 80 to less than 100 percent of the median, respectively). The upper half of the income hierarchy is divided into four groups (100 to less than 120 percent, 120 to less than 150 percent, 150 to less than 200 percent, and 200 percent or more of the median). Changes in relative income position within the time period observed are disregarded here, i.e., only the income positions of the first and last years are compared.
then, income mobility has remained low. It has declined considerably in eastern Germany in particular. 26 There are also marked differences in income mobility between men and women. 27 The finding of declining income mobility is confirmed both when studying a larger number of income classes and when taking other measures of mobility into account. 28 There has been very little research into its causes and mechanisms to date, merely indications that increasing (wage) inequality is associated with the trend toward lower (wage) mobility. for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and generally accepted in Europe.
The calculated equivalent income is allocated to each household member on the assumption that all household members benefit from the joint income equally. The head of household is given a needs weighting of 1; additional adults each have a weighting of 0.5, and children up to 14 years of age weightings of 0.3. 32 In other words, cost degression is assumed in larger households. That means, for example, that household income for a four-person household (parents, a 16-year-old, and a 13-year-old) is not divided by four as is the case in a per-capita calculation (=1+1+1+1), but by 2.3 (=1+0.5+0.5+0.3).
In all population surveys, a particular challenge is how to take missing values for individual people surveyed into account appropriately, in particular concerning questions considered sensitive, such as those about income. The incidence of missing values is often selective, with households with incomes far above or below the average refusing to respond.
In the SOEP data analyzed here, missing values are replaced using an elaborate imputation procedure that is both cross-sectional and longitudinal. 33 This also applies to missing values for individual household members refusing to answer any questions in households otherwise willing to participate in the survey. In these cases, a multi-stage statistical procedure is applied to six individual gross income components (earned income, pensions and transfer payments in case of unemployment, vocational training/tertiary-level study, maternity benefits/child-raising allowance/parental leave benefits, and private transfer payments). 34 For each new data collection, all missing values are always imputed again retrospectively, which can result in changes compared with earlier evaluations. As a rule, however, these changes are minor.
In order to avoid methods-based effects in the time series of calculated indicators, the first survey wave of the individual SOEP samples was excluded from the calculations. Studies
show that there are more changes in response behavior which cannot be attributed to differences in willingness to participate in the survey. Inequality of Market Incomes At-Risk-of-Poverty Rate 
